WRP v WRQ [2024] SGHCF 12

Outcome: Appeal Allowed in part.

Facts

1          The parties married in September 1997 and have three daughters. The parties were divorced in April 2013 and recorded a consent order in relation to ancillary matters. In 2023, the Husband applied to vary the Consent Order, where he had agreed that the matrimonial home can only be sold after the youngest daughter turned 21. The DJ allowed the Husband’s applications in part and the Wife appealed. The main issue is whether the Consent Order should be varied.

Court’s Decision:

2          The court has the power, pursuant to s 112(4) Women’s Charter, to vary orders, including consent orders relating to the division of matrimonial assets. This power is sparingly exercised because of the fundamental importance of finality in the context of the division of matrimonial assets.: at [4].

3          The court may vary an order if it is unworkable or has become unworkable. It will require even more to vary a consent order. In addition to the finality requirement, there is a policy objective of freedom of contract (and the related concept of sanctity of contract) which ought to be given effect to (as far as is possible) by the court.: at [4] to [5].

4          Although the idea of sanctity of contract is not applied directly in matrimonial proceedings as if they were commercial enterprises, weight is given to the negotiated settlement of the parties. Much give and take are involved in reaching such settlements, and the court should keep this in mind lest it gives more to the taker by taking more from the giver, contrary to the parties’ intentions.: at [5].

5          A consent order may be unworkable where new circumstances radically change the situation such that something which is radically different from what was originally intended will be implemented instead. In the present case, the Consent Order is clear and unambiguous.: at [7].

6          The acrimony in the present case is not long and drawn out, nor is it severe where physical injury was inflicted. The Wife’s conduct has not met the high threshold of a radical change in circumstances.: at [10].

7          It is fair for the Wife’s CPF refunds to be treated the same as the Husband’s CPF refunds. That is, the Wife should make the refunds to her CPF account from her own share of the sale proceeds. This is in line with the spirit of the Consent Order which provides for the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home to be divided equally.: at [11].

8          There is no agreement or obligation that the Wife pays a share of the mortgage. As the sole mortgagee for the matrimonial home, the Husband remains responsible for the loan, and for fulfilling the terms of the Consent Order.: at [14].

This summary is provided to assist the public to have a better understanding of the Court’s judgment. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s judgment.