CDV v CDW [2020] SGCA 100

Outcome: Appeal allowed

Facts

1            The Wife appealed against the High Court Judge’s decision to vary parties’ ancillary consent order (“Consent Order”), for the matrimonial home to be sold within three months of the date of variation. The Consent Order was recorded on 24 March 1994 before the enactment of s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“Charter”) which provides for the court’s power to vary an order for division of matrimonial assets. When the Consent Order was recorded, the governing provision for the division of matrimonial assets was s 106 of the 1985 edition of the Charter.

Court’s Decision:

2            The appeal was allowed and the Consent Order was to remain on the basis that: (a) the High Court Judge could not have varied the Consent Order by way of s 112(4) of the Charter, as the provision did not apply to the Consent Order but only to orders made after its enactment under s 112 of the Charter; and (b) in any event, there were no “exceptional reasons” justifying a variation of the Consent Order under s 112(4) of the Charter.

3            In determining whether a piece of legislation applied to events before its commencement (i.e., retrospectively), the court should first apply the purposive approach to statutory interpretation to determine the parliamentary intent. Only where there is ambiguity, the court may have regard to presumptions such as the presumption against retrospectivity. Applying this approach, the interpretation was that s 112(4) of the Charter only applies to orders made under s 112 of the Charter and not to orders made under the old s 106 of the Charter (such as the Consent Order): at [43] to [57].

4            In applying s 112(4) of the Charter, there must be “exceptional reasons” before a variation may be ordered, particularly where the order of court is based on a consent order between parties, given the policy considerations of finality and the freedom and sanctity of contract. If the order has been completely implemented, the court does not have the power to vary the order; if the order has not been completely effected or implemented, the court may vary the order only where the order is practically impossible to implement, or new circumstances arise, radically changing the situation so as to make implementing the order drastically different from what was intended. Financial difficulties per se do not satisfy the high threshold of unworkability: at [81], [84] and [86].

5            On the unworkability of an order, the court should not allow variation if: (a) the order became unworkable due to a self-induced change in circumstances; or (b) there is uncertainty as to whether the order will become unworkable: at [88], [91] and [105].

This summary is provided to assist the public to have a better understanding of the Court’s judgment. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s judgment.