This is the first case involving a sentencing framework for an offence under Section 9(1) of the Remote Gambling Act 2014 (RGA) for providing an unlawful remote gambling service for another.
Khoo Moy Seen pleaded guilty to one charge under Section 9(1)(e) of the RGA where, between 15 and 29 November 2020, Khoo assisted in the conduct of remote gambling in accordance with arrangements made by her principal. One other charge under Section 8(1) of the RGA was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. The district judge stated that the sentencing principle for offences under the RGA would clearly be one of deterrence, both specific and general. The district judge applied the sentencing approach for offences under Section 9(1) of the RGA in Public Prosecutor v Loy Jit Chan [2021] SGMC 9, which was based on the sentencing framework in Koo Kah Yee v Public Prosecutor [2021] 3 SLR 1440. The district judge sentenced Khoo to an imprisonment term of eight weeks and a fine of $20,000.
Khoo’s appeal was dismissed by Justice Vincent Hoong. A sentencing framework for offences under Section 9(1) of the RGA was adapted from the Koo Kah Yee sentencing framework for offences under Section 11(1) of the RGA. The sentencing ranges were adjusted to adequately calibrate for the different maximum imprisonment terms under Sections 9(1) and 11(1) of the RGA, and to ensure that the full spectrum of sentences under the former was utilised. It was observed that notwithstanding the differences between Sections 9(1) and 11(1) of the RGA, they were broadly similar in that they both sought to penalise persons for facilitating and providing unlawful remote gambling services, whether in their capacity as an agent or a principal.
This is the first case in which a sentencing framework was established for the offence of driving without due care and attention following legislative amendments to Section 65 of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (RTA).
Sue Chang pleaded guilty to a charge under Section 65(1)(a) punishable under Section 65(3)(a) of the RTA. He had failed to keep a proper lookout while driving along the Central Expressway and collided into the rear of a motorcycle before swerving and hitting the rear of a car. The motorcyclist was flung off her motorcycle and suffered a severe head injury and other extensive injuries to vulnerable parts of her body. She remained unresponsive and unable to obey commands, speak or communicate, despite multiple surgical procedures and intensive care.
The district judge adopted a sentencing approach based on a two-stage, five-step framework, which involved assessing the level of harm caused and the culpability of the offender, identifying an indicative starting sentence, and thereafter making adjustments to it. This adjustment was based first on the aggravating and mitigating factors specific to the offender, and second, on the totality principle which ensured that the sentence would not be crushing or substantially above the norm. Sue was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and disqualified from holding or obtaining all classes of driving licences for five years.
On appeal, the High Court, with the assistance of a young independent counsel, established a sentencing framework for Section 65 of the RTA. Justice Vincent Hoong held that the sentencing approach would guide sentencing judges to arrive at the appropriate sentence through a process of increasing granulation, which enhances analytical clarity and promotes the transparent articulation of reasons for the eventual sentence imposed. Sue’s appeal was dismissed, and the High Court affirmed the sentence imposed by the district judge.
This case involved the death by severe burns of a 20-year-old man. The deceased worked as a food delivery rider. To do his job, he had purchased a personal mobility device (PMD) from Carousell. The PMD that he purchased was fully modified, and the man further modified the PMD in the time that he owned it. A stock PMD of the same make and model was installed with a 10.4 amp-hour battery and a 36-volt motor that was rated for 250 watts. At the time of the accident, the PMD had a 72-volt, 24 amp-hour battery—with its battery management system removed—and a 60-volt motor that was rated for 4,500 watts.
The PMD’s modified motor required at least a 62.5 amp-hour battery to power it. As such, the modified battery that had a capacity of 24 amp-hours was underpowered. This component mismatch meant that the battery had to be rapidly recharged more frequently. In addition, bypassing the battery management system resulted in the battery being over-discharged during use and overcharged during charging. The frequent charging, overcharging and over-discharging damaged the individual lithium-ion battery cells that made up the battery.
On the fateful day, the deceased had ridden the PMD into a lift. Whilst in the lift, some of the lithium-ion battery cells failed catastrophically, releasing a massive amount of energy that damaged neighbouring cells which in turn released energy as they progressively failed. The heat from the failing lithium-ion cells resulted in a fire that spread to the combustible parts of the PMD, the deceased’s clothing and belongings, and, eventually, to the deceased. As he was confined in the lift, he was unable to escape the fire until the lift came to a stop. He died due to extensive burn injuries.
As part of the coroner’s findings, it was emphasised that PMD users should be aware of the inherent dangers posed by modified PMDs, and that they should not purchase modified PMDs or modify PMDs they have purchased. It was advised that users should only purchase PMDs that are UL2272-certified and registered with the Land Transport Authority.
Notable political personality Terry Xu was the respondent who faced prosecution in this case. The police applied for the continued retention of two electronic devices seized from the respondent, on the basis that these devices were relevant to contempt proceedings initiated against him.
Rejecting the application, the judicial officer found that the police had failed to provide sufficient information to satisfy the Court that there was a reasonable basis for thinking that the seized property was relevant for its stated purpose. Accordingly, the devices were to be returned to the respondent forthwith.
This case attracted a great deal of public interest and attention. The claimant and defendant had met in 2016, but issues began arising after they became misaligned about how they saw their relationship. While the defendant regarded the claimant as a friend, the claimant considered her to be his “closest friend”. Following threats of litigation by the claimant, the parties attended counselling for about a year and a half to no avail. Eventually, the defendant ceased communications with the claimant, who proceeded to sue her for damages in excess of $3 million in the High Court. After she filed her defence to the High Court claim, the claimant sued the defendant in the Magistrate’s Court for “lost income arising from his affected earning capacity”, which he claimed was caused by the defendant’s breach of an agreement between the parties.
In striking out the Magistrate’s Court claim for being an abuse of process, the judicial officer noted that the claim was a guise to compel the defendant to maintain communications with the claimant. The Court held that the claim was “intentionally initiated … with the ulterior motive of vexing or oppressing the defendant by requiring her to defend various claims that fundamentally stem from the same factual matrix in different forums”. The Court further stated that it would not “be an accessory to [the claimant’s] calculated attempt to compel engagement from the defendant who, after years of massaging the claimant’s unhappiness, has finally decided to stand up to his threats rather than cower and give in to his demands”.
This case is noteworthy for the Small Claims Tribunals (SCT) as it discussed the date of accrual of cause of action for the purposes of the SCT’s temporal jurisdiction under Section 5(3)(b) of the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984.
The respondent was a clinic providing aesthetic services. The claimant had purchased a package of treatment sessions from the respondent in 2012 and 2013. Sometime in 2013, the claimant suffered certain symptoms while undergoing treatment. The parties agreed to suspend the remaining sessions until such time when the symptoms subsided.
In 2018, the claimant was cautioned by his doctor to avoid the treatment. According to the claimant, the respondent agreed to continue suspending the contract and offered a conversion of the claimant’s outstanding sessions under the package to other treatments. Subsequently, the claimant approached the respondent in 2020 again, seeking to either convert the outstanding sessions to other treatments, or terminate the package due to frustration. The respondent did not agree.
While many arguments were raised, the noteworthy issue was whether the claimant’s cause of action originated in his purported discovery of the respondent’s alleged misrepresentation, false claims under the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act, and/or defective performance of the contract from 2020 to 2022, such that they were brought within the SCT’s two-year temporal jurisdiction. The claimant also suggested that the respondent had committed fraud such that the temporal jurisdiction could be extended under Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1959.
The SCT reviewed the legislative history of the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984 and concluded that the meaning of the phrase “date on which the cause of action accrued” under Section 5(3)(b) of the Act did not include the notion of discoverability. It distinguished the concept of limitation periods from the SCT’s temporal jurisdiction, and held that the concept of discoverability under the Limitation Act could not be imported into the Small Claims Tribunals Act. The SCT therefore discontinued the claimant’s claims based on acts and/or representations alleged to have been committed in 2012 or 2013.
These decisions are related matters, which received media attention, involving claims for wrongful dismissal brought by the former founder/Chief Executive Officer (C1) and the former Chief Financial Officer (C2) against different business units of a publicly listed company specialising in online payments.
The circumstances relating to the dismissals of both claimants were fairly unique in that they had both already resigned and were serving six-month notice periods. Both claimants were dismissed without notice on the grounds of gross misconduct when they each had just one month’s notice left to serve. In brief, the allegations against them were that they were obstructing new work processes and initiatives.
The Employment Claims Tribunals (ECT) allowed both claims and awarded substantial damages at or close to their jurisdictional limit. The ECT found that the allegations of gross misconduct against C1 were not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, there was a significant degree of overreach in C1’s termination letter to the extent that the allegations against him were extensively set out as justifications for his termination. The ECT similarly found that the allegations of gross misconduct against C2 were not sufficiently proven.
In any event, the respondents did not conduct any due inquiry before dismissing C1 and C2, which would have been a standalone ground to find that their dismissals were wrongful.
This case is unique as it involved the breach of an expedited protection order (EPO), which the respondent sought to justify as being necessary to serve legal documents.
The respondent was a social media influencer. The claimant had left a negative review on her own InstaStory of some salmon sashimi she purchased from one of the respondent’s business entities, before reaching out to the respondent for an explanation as to why the sashimi looked and tasted peculiar.
The respondent retaliated by sending direct messages to the claimant and made various posts about the latter in several tranches. In particular, the respondent reproduced a screenshot of the claimant’s Instagram account (with the claimant’s young daughter visible in the photo) and repeatedly used insulting language in her communications with the claimant.
Despite the claimant obtaining an EPO, which made clear that the respondent should only contact the claimant through the latter’s lawyers, the respondent turned up at the claimant’s apartment with two associates to serve her papers relating to the commencement of a defamation claim (which was subsequently withdrawn). Instead of a conventional envelope, the papers were served in a food chiller bag bearing a logo associated with the respondent’s business. Contrary to her claim that she intended to avoid being seen by the claimant, the respondent was caught on CCTV camera right outside the apartment engaging in celebratory high-fives with her associates after serving the papers on the claimant.
Among other considerations, the Protection from Harassment Court judge found the respondent’s conduct of contravening the EPO as indicative that the respondent was likely to continue contravening the relevant provisions under the Protection from Harassment Act in respect of the claimant. A protection order was granted in terms largely similar to the EPO.
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Last updated on 21 September 2023.